

16 November 1976

DDCI:

The Angleton interview with British  
ITV will be carried Thursday. The  
London Sunday Times says he will have  
several "revelations" -- that the Soviet  
Ambassador to the United Nations is a  
spy, that Tom Mboya was killed by the  
KGB, etc.

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Per your request, attached are the two  
most recent articles by Angleton and [REDACTED]

A new one, title unknown, is due out in  
December.

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*Pub. Affairs*



# American Cause

a bipartisan, tax-exempt, political education organization

The Honorable George Murphy, Director

Special Report  
September 1976

## A Tree at Panmunjom

Some observations on the sinister circumstances bearing on the axe-murder in August of our two American officers on the Korean truce line, and its larger meaning for Americans who may have forgotten why we are still there.

by James Angleton and C.J.V. Murphy

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In the whole sorry sequence of recent American failures to cope with communist challenges in Africa and Asia, no single event has given more serious cause for concern over the Government's capacity for effective action than its singularly evasive response to the axe-murder in midsummer of two young American Army officers by North Korean troops on the truce line at Panmunjom.

The offense itself was certainly plain enough in its elementary brutality. A mixed work party of South Korean and American officers and men entered the so-called "Demilitarized Zone," better known these past 23 years by its acronym, DMZ, on the innocent chore of pruning an intrinsically valueless poplar tree, the branches of which were conveniently obscuring the view of the communist line from a watchtower on the United Nations' side. For no apparent reason, other than to humiliate the United States Army, a larger body of North Korean soldiers fell upon the work force and bludgeoned the two officers to death with axes wrested from their own men. President Ford rightly charged the communists with having perpetrated "vicious and unprovoked murder" in an attack both "brutal and cowardly." But in their hasty settlement of accounts with the perpetrators of the outrage, the terms devised by him and Secretary of State Kissinger are likely to be celebrated in the history of our times much more for their ingenuity than for their moral character.

### Murderers Not Punished

Instead of insisting that the murderers be punished, the command decision was to punish the tree itself. The mute, unoffending poplar that had offered welcome shade to travellers on the old road that runs from Kaesong to Seoul was struck down. It was annihilated, root and branch.

It's a long way, as human experience is measured, from the Garden of Eden to the rude compound of Quonset huts and wooden shacks that form the village of Panmunjom. But the way

our highly placed public servants in Washington conducted themselves in the test of character raised by the grisly incident under the poplar is an uncomfortable reminder that ordinary men are still far from ever achieving the state of eternal grace that Adam lost for us in an earlier arboreal incident.

Adam, we know, failed a test of character under a fruit tree in the Garden of Eden. In their own hour of testing under the poplar at Panmunjom, the relatively small but extremely influential body of politicians, scholars, lawyers, executives, bureaucrats and technipols\* inside the National Security Council who as the Washington Special Action Group advise the President in crisis situations showed themselves, under circumstances far less seductive, to be no nobler than the unfortunate Adam. Instead of grappling with evil, they feasted on the drugged fruit of detente. They took out their frustrations on the poplar, rather than exact satisfaction and respect from a bold enemy.

### O! Woodman, Do Not Spare that Tree

In the humiliating aftermath, the rest of us Americans would do well to reflect long and hard on the implications attaching to that challenge at far-off Panmunjom. There's a saying that people are sometimes unable to see the forest for the trees. What that gentle aphorism argues is that some of us can usually be depended upon to lose sight of a main issue because we let ourselves be diverted by the minor pieces. But in the confusion and doubt that now prevail in the American attitude toward our responsibilities, risks and true interests abroad, a thoughtful assessment of the circumstances that brought on that bloody swirl of aggression at Panmunjom may give us a clearer comprehension of the forest of trouble and vexation that meets our gaze in Pacific Asia, on the horn of Africa, in the Indian Ocean and on the approaches to the Persian Gulf. Understanding what happened over the tree may, in other words, enable us better to judge what's going on in the forest itself.

How mixed up we really are is indicated by a poll of American opinions on current defense and foreign policy matters taken

\*Technicians, such as political, physical and social scientists, who conduct themselves as politicians, thereby achieving more influence and a higher status than their precursors, the technocrats.

by the Gallup Organization of Princeton or Potomac Associates, a liberal political research group recently settled in Washington, D.C. The results were published in *Foreign Policy*, another liberal quarterly, also based in the capital. They show that most Americans no longer expect much to be gained by our seeking closer relations with the Soviet Union and so have lost confidence in the magic of detente. Most Americans are also dubious about the wisdom of wasting too much effort on trying to improve our relations with communist China. Instead, they favor staying close to our present allies, seeing to it that American rights are treated with "respect" by other nations, and (rating 81 on a scale of 100) "keeping our military and defense forces strong." More than half—52 percent, in fact—believe that we should set about becoming "the world's most powerful nation." The bewildering aspect of these findings is that strong as was the feeling about the necessity for a powerful defense establishment, as an issue of urgent concern it was rated behind ten other national problems, all of a domestic nature, all of a materialistic interest.

Still, this peculiar anomaly in the American scale of values is not really as baffling as at first it may seem. Most of us find it all but impossible to make much sense of the arithmetic that goes into those awesome tables citing the ranges, the throwweights, the number of MIRVs associated with the strategic missile systems now drawn up on the two sides. Even more incomprehensible are the esoteric factors which will eventually determine the relative weights which the emerging Soviet supersonic Backfire, the American Cruise Missile, the controversial B-1 bomber and the huge and costly Trident submarine will each in its turn contribute to one side or the other of the military balance. These are all immensely complicated weapon systems that operate in the ocean depths, or in upper space, or are based far back in the hinterlands, and so are but rarely seen by the populace they are meant to defend.

Because so much of the new military technologies are over our heads, Secretary Kissinger can count on applause and cheers when he assures the rest of us, as he did in Phoenix in April, that we have no cause to "delude ourselves with fairy tales of America being second best." And that same month at Bossier City, in Louisiana, President Ford could promise, as indeed he did, that "as long as I hold this honored office I intend to see to it that the United States will never become second to anybody. Period."

That was officeseeking rhetoric. The President could not in truth supply a truly resounding, a wholly convincing period to his pledge. How far the balance has tilted against us, and in precisely which decisive elements of power, are matters that hover obscurely in the many imponderables affecting the weaponry and politics involved in the SALT process, beyond question the most confusing of all the urgent matters before us. The weapons being bargained over in the murky diplomacy of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have never been tried in war. No one really knows how precisely they can be controlled in a battle situation, or how they can best be foiled or countered. And at this stage our planners can only hypothesize just how our communist enemies intend to fit their ever-enlarging panoply of mass destruction weaponry alongside their huge conventional military establishments, and how it is all to be used in their broad strategy for isolating and diminishing the United States.

Even so, one does not have to master all these technical factors in order to form some reasonable idea of how we stand. The manner in which our communist adversaries conduct themselves toward us at various pressure points around the globe provides a set of measures for judging their intentions toward us and, even more, their confidence in being able to bring off whatever enterprise they may have in the making. That is a good reason for taking a close look at what happened at Panmunjom. That tree may tell us something important about the forest.

#### How President Eisenhower Stabilized the Line

We had best begin by refreshing our knowledge of how the truce line came to be fixed in the first place. When General Eisenhower entered the White House in January 1953, a provisional truce had been in force on the Korean battlefield for a year and a half. The armies faced each other across a zigzag line that ran across the waist of Korea a bit north, for the most part, of the 38th Parallel, the original partition boundary. In the Truman years, the war, which that decent man had carelessly described as "a police action," had cost 31,000 American dead, 91,000 wounded and some 13,000 missing who proved to be mostly dead. Throughout the exhausting haggles of the truce, the North Koreans and the far stronger Red Chinese forces in the line never stopped trying to improve their positions and to wear down American will. They did this by staging an interminable series of fierce local clashes that did not materially affect the main dispositions but did have the useful political effect of presenting the American people with an ever lengthening list of casualties.

Eisenhower's decision was the sensible one of a soldier turned President. It was to force the communist powers—the North Koreans, along with their Soviet and Chinese patrons—to bow to a formal armistice forthwith or face a dramatic enlargement of the war. He sent a fairly explicit warning through the Indian Government and various other channels that unless the fighting was stopped, he was prepared to break open the "sanctuary" in Manchuria from which the communist powers had supplied their field forces and to carry the war to whatever ports, air bases, railway systems and industrial areas in China and Manchuria that were supporting the communist armies. He warned, too, that the United States would no longer be self-constrained in having resort to tactical nuclear weapons, if that was a quick way to end the war. And to show that the threat was not a hollow one, he ordered two first-class Army divisions in Japan and a Marine division in reserve to be prepared for rapid deployment in Korea. A nuclear bomb wing was moved into the western Pacific.

That was the last clear-cut decision by an American president in a make-or-break political-military situation. Kennedy's blockade of Cuba in 1962 after the Soviet missiles were discovered there was not of the same soul-trying order of magnitude. Only a relative handful of Soviet troops had been risked in Cuba. The missiles themselves were not even operational. Eisenhower's decision, had he been obliged to execute it, would have put the United States in head-on collision with the Soviet Union and Red China, then locked together in fraternal alliance.

It was no bluff. Eisenhower was in dead earnest. The Russians took him at his word. Stalin had armed the North Koreans and unleashed them in June 1950, when Soviet intelligence, sup-

ported by the British traitors Philby and Burgess who were then liaison officials in Washington, mistakenly concluded that the Americans no longer felt bound to honor the UN pledge to maintain the independence of South Korea. Then, as the North Koreans were reeling back to the Yalu River in defeat at the onset of the first winter, he persuaded Chairman Mao Tse-tung to launch the Red army south from Manchuria, with the object of turning the tide of battle and driving the United States from the rim of Asia. Then, at the start of the second summer, in June 1951, with the Chinese in their turn falling back in defeat to the old UN line, the Russians deftly re-entered the situation and rescued the Chinese armies by engineering a cease-fire that allowed them to hold where they stood. And, finally, as the fourth summer wore on, with Stalin now dead, a formidable soldier strategist in the White House and the American military buildup in full swing, the Russians and the Chinese concluded they had not only lost the war but also any hope of retrieving the loss by undermining the American will to persevere.

On July 27, 1953, six months after Eisenhower took office, the Armistice was signed at Panmunjom. It established a No Man's zone two and a half miles wide and 151 miles long that extends from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan, ascending bitter mountains and coasting down steep and narrow valleys. The hope—a forlorn one, at best—was that eventually the dividing barrier of barbed wire would be dismantled and the Koreans on both sides would themselves reunite in independence under the UN's sheltering hand. Today, some 23 years later, a force of 41,000 Americans is still there, standing watch with a South Korean Army of 560,000. Facing them is the communist Marshal Kim Il Sung's first-class Army of at least 410,000 men, bountifully supported by Soviet-supplied air, artillery and tanks. The line at Panmunjom remains the most sensitive flashpoint of all the geography where United States and communist interests intersect.

#### Provocations Part of Soviet Strategy

It remains only because it serves the long-range strategy of Soviet-bloc policy to keep it so. The murder of the two officers is but the last of a continuing series of ambushes, bombings, snipings and assaults that have taken 49 American lives since the Armistice supposedly began. Add the casualties inflicted by the Koreans on each other, and the dead number more than 1,000. Eight years ago, six American soldiers were slain in an ambush near Panmunjom and last year an American major was all but beaten to death by North Korean guards at the truce site itself.

The August incident was of a piece with these provocations. A squad of 11 American and South Korean officers and men accompanied five South Korean tree-pruners to the poplar. As they made ready to proceed with the branch cutting, a group of North Korean guards came up and ordered them to desist. When the Americans stood their ground, a truck load of North Korean soldiers bore down upon them, and one of the officers was heard to shout an order to "kill." At the end of the melee, only minutes later, Captain Arthur G. Bonifas and Lieutenant Mark T. Barrett lay dead, their heads crushed by the blunt heads of the axes wrested from their workmen.

The survivors, five of whom were also stabbed or badly hurt, fell back. Reluctant to retaliate on his own, the American General in command notified our Embassy in Seoul and the Joint

Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon of the attack and waited for instructions.

They were two fretful days in coming from Vail, Colorado, where the President was vacationing. All they called for was exercising a handful of fighters and a few B-52s in formation within eyeshot of the communist delegation at Panmunjom, but cautiously and unprovocatively inside the South Korean frontier. They also called for sending another and bigger party of workmen back to the poplar with orders not just to prune it but to cut it down. The tree was felled, expeditiously, with power saws.

The North Koreans did not interfere this time. There was hardly reason for them to do so. They had already made their point. All that President-Marshal Kim Il Sung felt called upon to do by way of amends was to toss off a note which termed the first incident "regretful" but artfully implied that the Americans had brought it on themselves. The note was gingerly received by Dr. Kissinger who first deemed it "unsatisfactory" only to "flip-flop" (a term which has been sharply honed by the presidential speechwriters for use against Governor Carter) into the opposite conclusion a day later that American honor had somehow been required, in ways perceptible only to himself and, perhaps, President Ford.

#### United States a "Paper Tiger"

What was the point that President Kim Il Sung had made? It stands to reason that when his soldiers sallied forth to repel the tree-pruners, he was not seeking a *casus belli*. A big war with the United States is the last thing either the Soviet Union or communist China wants at this point in time. But neither was the attack the "looney" and "unpremeditated" action which some apologists such as the CBS man Kalb would have us believe. The point that the North Koreans were out to make under the poplar was the same one they seek to drive home whenever they goad, harass, or waylay an American patrol. It is the one that was in their minds eight years ago when they crippled and boarded the *Pueblo* in international waters. Their point is to demonstrate to our allies and third-world countries that the United States is losing the moral fortitude for struggle. It can be chivvied into slipping out from under its world commitments. It is becoming the "paper tiger" that Mao Tse-tung once said it was, a judgment reinforced at his own bier by the kow-towing not only by the President but also by a cortege led by a former Secretary of Defense who was fired by the President himself.

There is no mystery about the long-term objectives which Kim Il Sung shares with his Moscow suppliers and with his fellow Asians and war comrades in Peking. It is to finish the task of driving the United States off its last remaining stronghold on the Asian mainland that was begun under Soviet-Chinese auspices 16 years ago.

Three years ago, the negotiations that were proclaimed to produce the "peaceful reunification" of the Korean peninsula broke down. Since then the North Koreans have concentrated on further enlarging their already huge military establishments. The Russians have supplied them with more tanks and aircraft than we have given the South Koreans. They have added greatly to the many artillery battalions deployed behind the truce zone. The Russians have further strengthened them with missiles capable of striking Seoul from forward positions. And what is even more ominous as regards the ability of the South Koreans to arrest another invasion, the North Koreans have



been busy as moles driving tunnels under the DMZ. The South Koreans have already uncovered two that are wide and high enough to pass trucks and tanks and even deliver a division of infantry behind their forward positions in an hour or two. From intelligence sources, it has been determined that as many as 12 such tunnels have been dug. This massive effort underlines the communist intent and determination to wipe the slate clean of the remaining American presence in Asia and it further reminds us of the high value which communist strategy places on surprise.

#### The Difficult Question of Self-Interest

Why are we Americans still in that distant, dangerous place? Communist propaganda and our liberal-left journalism would have the rest of the world believe—and unfortunately, too many Americans as well—that it is only to maintain the less-than-democratic regime of President Park Chung Hee and to cling to the remnants of imperialism. In truth, we remain in Korea because of the acute vulnerability of an unarmed, still largely pacifist Japan, now recently awakened by two events to the need for applying its own mind to its peril: The shattering revelations leaked by Senator Church, defeated in his own ambitions, and by the stalwart Soviet pilot, who sought sanctuary and freedom in a democratic Japan exposed to predatory communism. We fought there in 1950 primarily to keep that talented and industrious society from passing in its helplessness under the hegemony of either communist China or the Soviet Union.

The pity is that too few among us remember that it is the promise to protect a Japan which we defeated and disarmed three decades ago that binds us to the defense of South Korea. A reality governs our presence there that the incalculably influential organs of our journalism—the networks, *The New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the liberal weeklies—have deliberately ignored in their obsession with the alleged inequities of President Park. The attack which they have lately and simultaneously mounted on him is almost identical in its rationale with the ones these same organs used to bring down President Thieu in Vietnam and are now contriving for the downfall of the Shah of Iran. If we intend to maintain a working position on the western Pacific, the United States cannot back out of Korea merely because a mischief-making handful of liberal-leftist journalists do not like the way Park governs. A pull-out would leave Japan naked and the islands of the western Pacific—the Philippines, Okinawa, eventually even Australia—as strategic counters to be swept up by the ascendant power.

#### Self-Interest and Political Morality

The hard lesson that we should have learned from the American experience in the Cold War is that to draw a line in strategy and foreign policy which attempts to take in both self-interest and political morality can't help but be tortuous and a slithering exercise. As *The Economist* of London pointed out in a characteristically well-reasoned leader in its issue of 28 August, if self-interest is now to govern American strategy Israel would

wholly be eliminated as an object of concern. So would Europe, for that matter. Indeed, by that standard, only the energy-yielding kingdoms of the Persian Gulf would be absolutely indispensable to American action, and none of them qualifies as a model of democratic pluralism.

How is either self-interest or morality to be served by "normalizing" relations with the Peking communists (who have little to exchange with us of practical value) if the process is to be at the expense of our pledge to defend Taiwan, a stout ally and a fruitful and fair trade partner to boot? Where is either self-interest or morality, let alone wisdom, to be found in an African policy that is prepared to sacrifice the material and political rights of white minorities in Africa to blacks after the squalid events in Uganda, Kenya and Angola have shown that black majorities, once in power, sweep minorities, including Indians, aside?

And, finally, do their people really have sound legal grounds for their pitiless attack on the Park government? Seoul, Korea is in a state of war. It is surrounded North and West by enemies. To suspend a few rights, as it has done, is not unnatural for democratic societies in similar peril. In fact, Israel has done so because it, too, is in peril. In fact, given the pathetic American performance at Panmunjom, we could wish that our leaders had drawn upon the same moral design that inspired Prime Minister Rabin to redeem Israel honor at Entebbe.

#### A House of Many Mansions

Equal with the oil, natural resources, and the political elements are the intangibles—the worth of stout-minded and independent societies ready to help Americans and their allies hold a crucial line; friends who will stand alongside us in defense of the vital moral interest. In the real world the only sensible system of alliance is one that is itself a house of many mansions. That was what the containment policy started out to be.

Everywhere the lines are shortening. The weakness of the United States is essentially an inner one. Americans of the liberal left, especially in politics and journalism, are more passionately devoted to confounding the American public than in facing up to the communist threat. For them, the real enemy in Korea is our ally, a stubborn President Park who must be responsive to the perils of his nation. In their view, executing the tree at Panmunjom was a safe way out of a bad situation in which no one in authority wanted to consult our immediate self-interest, let alone our moral responsibility to the tenets of the nation.

We have a proposal for honoring the trophies from that inglorious action. If it has not been done already, let the logs of the poplar be flown in Air Force One back home and racked alongside the fireplace in the Secretary of State's Reception Room at Foggy Bottom. There, when he delights himself in *tete-a-tete* confidences with envoys from the other camp, the men of detente can warm their hands, if not their souls, over the dying embers of what only 23 years ago was the American and Korean sacrifice for Panmunjom.



# American Cause

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The Honorable George Murphy, Director

Special Report  
June 1976

## On the Separation of Church and State

Some preliminary observations on the lamentable consequences of the Senior Senator from Idaho for the national intelligence services.

James Angleton and Charles J. V. Murphy

*Mr. Angleton spent 31 years with the Office of Strategic Services [OSS] and the Central Intelligence Agency, and through the last 20 years was Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA. Mr. Murphy is a retired writer, Time-Life and Fortune magazine.*

When the first revelations in Washington of the alleged misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency became a sensation in the European press 17 months ago, a veteran diplomat in Bonn expressed his consternation that the government of a great country should let itself be driven to disgorge vital state secrets affecting the security of the nation and its allies. "You don't have a country over there," he scolded *The New York Times* correspondent, "you have a huge church."

That subtle witticism went right over *The New York Times'* good, gray, humorless head. The friendly diplomat had shrewdly perceived at the source of the orgy of self-criticism convulsing Congress and the press alike something more primitive than witch-burning or the whiplash of Puritan conscience. What he had discerned was not so much the return of a rebuking godly institution to American politics as the emergence of a fresh evangelical phenomenon in the affairs of State—a church spelled with capital "C." Frank Church, to be precise, the senior Senator from Idaho. Events have borne out the diplomat's appraisal. In May, Senator Church emerged as a bustling candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination. In June, he was maneuvering on Jimmy Carter's coattails for the Vice-Presidential spot.

Church is a blown-in-the-bottle, copper-riveted, 24-carat example of the rough diamond from the frontier polished into a political celebrity within Washington's liberal left-wing Establishment. At 51, to be sure, he still slides easily when out on the hustings into the arm-waving, tub-thumping and rolling rhetoric that earned him in *Time* the accolade of "the boy orator of the Snake River Valley." But he is also master, as *The Washington Post's* senior political analyst David S. Broder recently noted, of the "cool, controlled" style that is most effective on television and over cigars and brandy in Averell

Harriman's drawing rooms. And, in common with most ambitious politicians, he has kept both ears glued to the ground. Broder makes this additional observation: "He is a man who says, with a straight face, that only someone with 20 years' experience as a Washington insider has the know-how to take on the dreadful bureaucracy."

It takes more than a straight face for a man of Church's associations to carry off such a posture. It takes a strong stomach, too. Church has been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 19 years. During his service there he made his mark as an Establishment man. When the Johnson administration presented the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, he voted for it. He was ranged alongside the rest as the calls came for ever bigger appropriations to carry on the Vietnam war. The sea change in his opinion about the American role in the outer world came only after the public had become disillusioned with the feckless strategy devised by President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara to satisfy the liberal establishment of which he is part. By Nixon's day, Church's interventionism had turned isolationist. Under the new colors he enlisted with the turncoats and co-authored the divisive legislation trimming the President's war powers and bringing disgrace and shame to the American exit from Southeast Asia. He was all for suspending foreign aid as early as 1971. While our troops were fighting in the field, he took his family on a junket to the Soviet Union, the chief arms supplier to our enemies. His virtuosity on the negative side of foreign policy makes him the logical successor to the aging Sparkman as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—or, as Church would render it, the Little or No Foreign Relations Committee.

### The Statesman as Muckraker

Church's swift rise inside the Liberal, left-wing Establishment has been sped by far more dramatic actions than these, however. In April, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, of which he was Chairman and in full control, issued a two-volume, 815-page report advocating no less than 183 measures designed to restrict the various intelligence activities conducted by the Federal



Government. That work was 15 months in the making and during that interval scarcely a day passed that a bewildered nation did not see Senator Church's name on the front pages of the newspapers or his round, bejeweled presence crowding the television screen.

All that while he kept a sideshow going in an adjoining tent that was almost as destructive as the other. Four years ago, he took over the Chairmanship of a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee that was set up to investigate the operations of American-owned multinational corporations. His progressive disclosures of certain regrettable practices adopted by famous corporations to sweeten their sales pitches in foreign lands have been hardly less destructive of our nation's reputation abroad than the shocks produced by his exposes of the CIA and the FBI. Eminent personages in Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and Saudi Arabia have been embarrassed, possibly ruined, by the details which he and his staff leaked to the press. Governments of friendly nations have been dismayed and shaken by the evidence of scandal in their own ranks, sprung upon them without warning and certainly without the benefit of judicial process.

There is an old-fashioned word for these lurid enterprises. The word is muckraking. *The Economist* of London, a journal which follows American affairs with a perceptive eye, described Church in January as "the scourge of immorality in undercover intelligence operations, and the inquisitor of corrupt practices by American corporations abroad"—prosecutor-cum-judge-cum-ury on the dirty tricks of his countrymen in other lands.

Let us give the muckraker his due. The CIA and the FBI in their arcane and overlapping responsibilities did engage in some legal and ill-advised operations, although these were by no means altogether reprehensible when weighed in light of the national security considerations prevailing at the time. The CIA did briefly consort with political assassins who appear to have been recruited from "the gang that couldn't shoot straight," and did allow itself to be briefly drawn into unworthy technologies associated, among other things, with explosive cigars. And in the realm of international commerce, where saints would carve, such respectable corporations as Lockheed and Northrop did pay out large sums to foreign agents and middlemen in ways which abroad, in most cases, were within the prevailing custom and usage for paying commissions, finder's fees, or whatever. It has all been laid out for the rest of the world to see—the crumpled skeletons rooted out of the closets of six administrations.

Now is the time to measure the benefits, if any, from the muckraking—and to take the measure of the muckraker as well. The *auto-du-fe* proceedings against the plane makers and the arms dealers remain alive, and while they last it is quite impossible to tell how many jobs of American workers they will eventually lose, how much foreign exchange will be sacrificed, and how much of the market for the world's best goods of their kind will be closed off. But the Select Committee on Intelligence has already been disbanded, without tears, and its huge staff returned to the rear corridors of the Federal ant heap. Now the Senate in collective wisdom must decide for itself how far it is prepared to go in fitting to the intelligence services, and most importantly a now shaky and harassed CIA, the straitjacket Senator Church and the Committee's staff have brazenly tailored for it. It's a good time, too, for the rest of us to start making up our

minds about the real lessons to be drawn from the whole untidy experience and deciding what is to be salvaged from the debris.

### A Fantasy to Match the Idaho Mountains

For these weighty deliberations, Senator Church's report isn't much of a help. He personally pays lip service to the maxim that reliable and timely intelligence is desirable in the interest of national security. He praises himself and the committee staff for the discretion he would have us believe they exercised where national secrets were concerned. The truth is, of course, that it was an open secret in Washington that just about every intelligence secret revealed in camera before the committee found its way to the press. The Committee's report had exhausted its surprises long before it ever went to the printer.

The document is disappointing in other and more serious respects. Senator John G. Tower of Texas, the Vice Chairman, refused to put his name to the report, and he was joined in his abstention by Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Senator Tower reproved the Chairman and the majority members for ignoring the main task laid upon them by the Congress: that was to weigh the nation's needs in intelligence, measure the performance of the various intelligence agencies in meeting those needs, and suggest how best the intelligence work could henceforth go forward without upsetting "the delicate balance between individual liberties and national security."

Instead, the document is overwhelmingly a political tract for those Senators who wish to reduce the American position in the world: a scornful sermon on the inequities that, by their lights, are inherent in the intelligence process, especially in the field of covert political action. The report, by and large, denigrates the virtue of vigilance and prudence. It takes a harpy's delight in dogging the occasional misdeeds and misdemeanors, the improprieties, the blunders. There is contemptuous reference to the CIA's implied proclivity for the "dark arts of secret intervention—bribery, blackmail, abduction, assassination"—put at "the service of reactionary and repressive regimes," a bias which the chairman and his staff has caused U.S. foreign policy to become generally identified with "the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new."

Beyond all that, Senator Church argues airily that the CIA's covert activities, as well as those of the FBI in espionage matters, are largely stimulated by an exaggerated and now outmoded fear of Soviet intentions which he fails to define. American interests abroad, he would have us believe, would be far better served if the CIA were to become less edgy about Soviet actions and indeed if it ignored altogether the less blatant Soviet-fostered interventions in distant parts of the world. "We have gained little, and lost a great deal from our past policy of compulsive intervention," he argues, and from this conclusion he has compounded a peculiar prescription for taking the United States out of the Cold War, which was not of our making, and out of the world itself.

He urges us all to take "a longer view of history"—hardly an original piece of advice. He becomes more specific, though, when he bids the Executive Branch to rid itself of "a fantasy"—a figment of presumably overheated imaginations—that has "entrapped and enthralled our Presidents." His precise term for this deranged condition is "the illusion of American omni-

potence," a polysyllabic echo of former Senator J. William Fulbright's acid phrase, "the arrogance of power," which mocked earlier American efforts from Truman through Lyndon Johnson to stay communist aggression and subversion.

Yet, on the recent evidence, it is Senator Church and his zealous supporters who have become enthralled with fantasy--the fantasy that the Russians have called off the Cold War. His long service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should have armored him against such a fancy. It is even more bewildering that he should still hold that notion after devoting so much time inquiring into the work of an agency whose principal business it is to contend with Soviet subversion and strategic deception.

The CIA files on the counterintelligence side of the House have been consistently clear on the point that the Kissinger diplomacy has not deflected the Kremlin from its basic objectives: Detente is a sham, a tactic; it is Soviet communism's Potemkin Village for waging Cold War.

It could be that Senator Church is only a cynic, as Mr. Broder suggests. That is no uncommon trait in a politician. Or it may be that he has decided to present himself as detente's man for all seasons. Be that as it may, the intellectual boundaries that separate him from the real world in which the CIA until recently operated so spiritedly and the one that fills his private vision are as stark as the mountains that wall off his native heath in Idaho. One has only to examine the Committee's findings on the CIA's intermittent intrusions in Chile, between 1963 and 1973, to appreciate how successful the man from Idaho has been in raising a fantasy to match his mountains.

### The High Stakes in Chile

That the United States Government, starting with President Kennedy, channeled support, some of it through the CIA, to pro-American conservative and moderate political groupings in Chile is not in dispute, although one might question the wisdom of making the issue a shuttlecock in our domestic politics. The efforts of the late Salvadore Allende-Gossens to capture Chile for a communist minority in 1964 were foiled in some part by the CIA. Allende was already looking to Fidel Castro and, through him, to Moscow for the funds and managerial skills he had to have for making full-scale revolution. The American motive was to prevent Castro from spreading his influence into the Andes. The CIA's intervention in the Chilean political process consisted of little more than of providing funds for political rallies and editorial debate aimed at inducing the Christian Democrats and the moderate parties, who commanded a massive majority, to put aside their differences in the common interest of keeping Allende and his Marxist coalition from slipping into the Presidency through the gap between them.

That glancing intervention succeeded on an investment of but a few million dollars and the talents of a handful of specialists. Six years later, the contest was re-enacted, with the noncommunists again split and Allende and the radicals still controlling only 36 percent of the popular votes. This time he won because Kissinger was too much engrossed in wangling a visa to Peking, coming to terms with Hanoi, and cultivating detente with Moscow to heed the intelligence warnings from Santiago. Had the Army not risen against Allende in September 1973, he would to-

day rank second only to Castro in the communist hierarchy outside the Soviet bloc.

The mischief in Church's handling of the CIA role in Chile issues from the crude attempt of his staff to saddle the CIA with the blame for Allende's fall. A separate report issued by the staff, which was drafted outside the Committee's cognizance but issued with the Chairman's sanction, charged the agency with having "worked through the covert process to subvert democratic processes" and having thereby brought "an end to constitutional government" in that storm-tossed country.

Such a finding is, to say the least, the shameless distortion of the facts that Senator Goldwater in his dissent said it was. To arrive at it, Senator Church's scholars had to gloze Allende's avowed schemes, in open association with platoons of Soviet and Cuban advisors, for silencing all political opposition, nationalizing industry, collectivizing the land, and firing up a revolution that would support Castro's campaign to destroy American influence, root and branch, below the Rio Grande.

"Cuba in the Caribbean," Allende proclaimed in 1970, "and a Socialist Chile...will make revolution in Latin America." Castro toured Chile before the 1970 election to rally the discontented to Allende's banner. Allende himself made no less than nine trips to Havana between 1956 and 1970. In 1968, he saw to it, as President of the Chilean Senate, that Cuban survivors from Che Guevara's foundered guerrilla war in Bolivia were given safe passage home; and, later, as President he permitted Castro to use Cuba's diplomatic offices in Chile to run his espionage and political agents in Bolivia, the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay. There was no doubt about Allende's ambition: it was to set the Andes aflame.

Chile escaped sinking into a communist dictatorship by the skin of its teeth. The U.S. had little influence in the outcome. As for the liberal, left-wing panjandruns in the Congress and the press, it is depressingly plain that they still would have us believe that the overthrow of Allende was a crime against the constitutional order. They seem to have learned nothing from the test: Castro and the Soviet revolution-makers did. Allende's initial success in 1970, for which they orchestrated the strategy, encouraged them in the belief that Chile would provide communists in other societies with a model of how an electoral minority could achieve mastery inside parliamentary societies through skillful manipulation of the democratic process--a strategy presently being pursued with delicacy in Italy, France and Portugal. Allende's failure drove home the lesson that where the margins are thin the power cannot be held unless the armed forces have been brought under communist control.

When, therefore, Moscow's man in Portugal, Alvaro Cunhal, made his move in Portugal in 1974, just about a year later, he did so from what appeared to be a solid base of support within the armed forces themselves. Fortunately for Europe, the base was not as solid as at first it seemed. Once it started to crumble, as it finally did last winter, Cunhal prudently yielded the field with scarcely a shot. Then in Angola, a textbook application of Cuban military force behind a locally contrived "Popular Front" finally produced a decisive result--another fallen domino.

We would do well to ponder two inescapable questions: What weight would American counsel carry throughout Latin America, now that Castro has conquered an immensely promising strategic base for communist expansion in southern Africa, if Allende, his grateful ally, stood astride the Andes today?

What if anything can we expect from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee dominated by a man as befuddled as Frank Church is by the fantasies of detente, when Castro returns his attentions to Latin America, as in due course he will and must, to knock down for good the Chilean domino Allende all but toppled?

### The Missed Opportunity

The missed meaning of the struggle for Chile is central to an understanding of the Church Committee's failure in what could and should have been a landmark inquiry into the methods and worth of intelligence. Quite above and beyond the question of whether the CIA was a "rogue elephant" running amok inside a constitutional society—the Committee to its credit ruled otherwise—there was the larger continuing question of whether it is up to the job. To understand what the job is, one has to take stock of the threat that the communist bloc presents to national security. On this crucial subject the report is all but silent.

Nowhere in its wordy, censorious document is there to be found a reasonable appraisal of the threat which the CIA was created to meet and fend off; nor of the changing disguises which that threat wears; nor of the changing targets at which it is aimed. There is no helpful information for American citizens about the character and resources of the KGB and the 27 other clandestine intelligence and espionage organizations which the Soviet bloc has mounted against the West. One looks in vain for a judicious assessment of the competence of the CIA to cope with these adversary services. And as for judging the performance of our own agency in appraising the Soviet Union's true capabilities and exposing its intentions, the pages are disgracefully blank.

American intelligence, along with its brilliant successes in the reconnaissance technologies, has suffered at least three serious failures over the last eight years. It was surprised by the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It failed to call the Tet offensive in Vietnam earlier that same year. And it missed the Arab strike prepared for Yom Kippur. What is even more embarrassing, the communist war memoirs that have lately appeared in Hanoi convey a sinister hint that the highest American and South Vietnamese war councils were thoroughly penetrated by the enemy.

Finally, on the analytical side, the CIA has lately concluded that it has been underestimating the annual Soviet investment in weapons, forces, and military research and development by as much as 100 percent.

These are matters that Senator Church might profitably have addressed. Last fall, the House of Representatives own parallel Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative Otis Pike of New York made a promising start toward identifying the reasons for these failures. Unfortunately, that high purpose was quickly knocked aside by a left-wing majority bent on surpassing the rival committee in the volume of its leakage. Its final and still classified report, passed to a radical newspaper in New York, was consigned to the dust bin by an embarrassed House.

Unfortunately, the mischief has by no means ended. In May, the Senate responded to the Church Committee's report by creating a permanent 15-member select committee to oversee the

operations not only of the CIA but also those of all the other intelligence agencies—the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency as well. The Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees in both Houses will, as in the past, retain a jurisdiction in intelligence operations. The range of oversight had earlier been greatly widened by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of October 1974 requiring that six committees in Congress—with half the Senate and 20 Representatives on their rosters—be apprised in advance of any covert action by the CIA under consideration by the President.

In emptying the CIA's "bag of dirty tricks," in Church's melodramatic phrase, the Congress had thus ended up by unclothing and all but disarming that agency at the same time. The vulnerability of the new committee to the vagaries of political self-interest can be ascertained from a cursory examination of the stands taken in the Senate on defense and foreign policy issues by the majority of its members. A sobering benchmark is the National Security Voting Index published in April by the American Security Council. This index rates the members of both Houses of Congress, on a scale ranging from zero to 100, by their votes on ten critical national security defense issues which a poll taken by the Opinion Research Corporation has established are favored by most Americans. On that index and in terms of the relative weights of their support of legislation most Americans consider critical to the nation's security, the eight most liberal members of the new intelligence oversight committee rank as follows:

|                      |     |
|----------------------|-----|
| Hart, Colorado       | 0%  |
| Bayh, Indiana        | 17% |
| Stevenson, Illinois  | 0%  |
| Biden, Delaware      | 0%  |
| Case, New Jersey     | 11% |
| Hatfield, Oregon     | 0%  |
| Huddleston, Kentucky | 25% |
| Inouye, Hawaii       | 43% |

It comes as a shock to realize that the paramount authority over the CIA and the associated military intelligence agencies will henceforth be exercised for the Senate by a body the majority of whose members are convinced, with Church, that the Soviet threat has waned. They will be supported, as he was, by a staff drawn from specialists of congenial outlook. Senator Mansfield has assured us that the traditional rules of self-discipline binding these bodies to reticence can be depended upon to protect the nation's intelligence secrets from disclosure. Alas, the feeble gestures the House of Representatives has so far made toward uncovering the source of the leak of the Pike Committee report to Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System hardly makes for confidence on that score.

Intelligence is the nation's first line of defense. In weighing the numerous other proposals put before it by the Member from Idaho, for further crippling and truncating the intelligence function, the Senate would be well advised in the Bicentennial year to give heed to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers: to keep Church (Frank) and State (affairs of) separate, at least where these life-and-death matters are concerned.

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